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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 12.80.070 WAS NOT VOID FROM INCEPTION 
At Point I A of their Brief, Respondents1 argue that Salt Lake City Ordinance 
12.80.070 which allows travel in a left-hand bicycle lane was void from its inception, and 
when the Court of Appeals declared the ordinance invalid, it would not deny petitioners due 
process of law if applied retroactively. 
Respondents also argue that this Court should declare the Salt Lake City bicycle 
ordinance void ab initio because it is manifestly contrary to the State statute requiring a 
bicycle rider to ride on the right side of the roadway. 
Citing Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16, Respondents assert that a city may not enact or 
enforce an ordinance in conflict with the State's traffic rules and regulations. Petitioners 
agree with this basic premise. However, Respondents' argument that the City's ordinance 
is void ab initio because it conflicted with State law presumes the very premise upon which 
the argument is based, i.e., that there was in fact a conflict with State law. This argument is 
flawed and must fail. There was no obvious conflict between the State statutes and the 
language of Salt Lake City's Bicycle Ordinance. 
1
 Because Respondent, Amanda Eyre, has joined in the Brief of Respondent, The 
Nature Conservancy, Petitioner will refer to the arguments of The Nature Conservancy as 
the arguments of Respondents. 
1 
Petitioners agree with the general proposition that municipalities derive their powers 
from the State and that Section 41-6-16 limits the power of a city to adopt an ordinance in 
conflict with State law. However, it does not follow that the City's Bicycle Ordinance is 
void ah initio. At page 9 of Respondents' brief, they argue: 'The ordinance at issue was 
void from its inception because it purported to permit what the Utah Traffic Control Act 
prohibits - riding a bicycle against the flow of traffic." Their argument is logically flawed 
because it presumes that the ordinance allows prohibited conduct. To the contrary, the city 
ordinance does not allow any conduct that is prohibited by any State law. A bicycle 
traveling in a designated bicycle lane, adjacent to a vehicle lane, is not riding "against 
traffic." 
Because the Court of Appeals appears to have accepted as true, without analysis, the 
idea that Hansen was riding against traffic,2 the error of using this term in the context 
argued by Respondents and accepted by the Court of Appeals must be examined. 
Respondents characterize Hansen's riding in the left-hand bicycle lane as "riding 
against the flow of traffic." Respondents assert that the District Court held (1) that state 
statutory law clearly requires bicyclists to ride with, not against, traffic. Brief of 
Respondents ("Brief) at 4. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District 
2
 In the Background paragraph of its opening, the Court of Appeals begins its 
factual background statement by stating "On February 17, 2000, Hansen was riding his 
bicycle eastbound on the lefthand side of the street and against the flow of traffic." 74 
P.3dat 1184. 
2 
Court, holding that to the extent the Salt Lake City Ordinance permits a bicyclist to ride 
against the flow of traffic, it is invalid. Id. (Citation omitted). 
The Appellate Court erred in accepting, without analysis, the idea that Hansen was 
riding his bicycle "against the flow of traffic." The error in this conclusion is obvious. On 
any two way roadway, there are eastbound and westbound lanes. In the context used by 
Respondents and the Court of Appeals, a bicycle traveling westbound in an eastbound lane 
would be traveling "against traffic." Such travel would create a conflict between the bicycle 
and the other vehicles traveling in the same lane and would be dangerous. 
However, on every two way roadway, the center eastbound and westbound lanes are 
contiguous. Vehicles travel in opposite directions in these abutting lanes without conflict or 
danger. So long as vehicles stay in their assigned lanes, they travel without conflict. Thus, 
the fact that there is travel in abutting lanes, going in opposite directions, does not mean 
that vehicles traveling in different directions are moving "against traffic." 
Hansen was not riding "against traffic," as argued by Respondents and as assumed 
by the Court of Appeals, because he was not riding in the roadway in a lane where there 
would be a conflict with the other motorized vehicles. He was riding in a bicycle lane 
abutting the roadway, and so long as vehicles on the roadway stayed in their lane and the 
bicycle stayed in its lane there would be no conflict between vehicles in the roadway and 
bicycles in the bicycle lane. 
3 
There is also nothing in the State Vehicle Code that says that a vehicle cannot travel 
"against traffic." The term "against traffic" is never used in the Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
41-6-53, and 41-6-87(1) only say that bicycles are to travel on the right-hand side of the 
roadway, with some exceptions. However, Hansen was not riding on the "Roadway." He 
was riding in a designated bicycle lane. 
"Roadway" is defined by Utah Code Ann. §41-6-1(39) as: 
"Roadway" means that portion of highway improved, designed, 
or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the 
sidewalk, berm, or shoulder, even though any of them are used 
by persons riding bicycles or other human-powered vehicles. If 
a highway includes two or more separate roadways, roadway 
refers to any roadway separately but not to all roadways 
collectively. 
Thus a roadway is that portion of a highway open to all vehicular travel. 
The term "vehicle" is also defined. 
"Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or by which any person 
or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, 
except devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-1(55). 
Thus while a bicycle is a vehicle, not all vehicles are bicycles. A bicycle lane limits 
travel to bicycles. All other vehicles are expressly prohibited from traveling in a bicycle 
lane. Therefore, a bicycle lane is not part of a "Roadway" because other types of vehicular 
traffic are forbidden use of the bicycle lane. Sections 41-6-53 and 41-6-87(1) apply to 
bicycles traveling on a "Roadway." They do not address a bicycle traveling in a separate 
lane designated for bicycles which, by definition, is not a part of the "Roadway." 
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A correct understanding of the distinction between a designated bicycle lane and the 
"Roadway" helps clarify the whole statutory scheme set out in Section 41-6-87. Instead of 
there being conflict, as is argued by the Respondents, we have an orderly traffic scheme 
designed to prevent conflicts between bicycles and other vehicles using a highway.3 
Section 41-6-53 deals generally with "vehicle" travel on a roadway, but Section 41-
6-87 deals specifically with bicycle travel on a roadway. While Section 41-6-87(1) 
reiterates the general rule of Section 41-6-53 that a vehicle on a roadway should travel on 
the right-hand side of the roadway, and sets out some specific rules for bicycles operating 
on a roadway, the legislature also said: 
"If a usable path for bicycles (a bicycle lane) has been provided 
adjacent to a roadway, bicycle riders shall use the bicycle path 
and not the roadway." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(3). 
By providing that a bicyclist must use the bicycle lane and not the roadway, the legislature 
expressly recognized that it considered a separate bicycle lane not to be a part of the 
roadway, and that when a bicycle lane was available, a bicyclist should travel in the bicycle 
lane and not on the roadway. 
The legislature, in adopting Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(3) clearly envisioned 
situations where separate travel lanes (bicycle lanes) might be created adjacent to the 
3
 The term "highway" is defined by the Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-1(15) as "the 
entire width between property lines of every way or place of any nature when any part of 
it is open to the use of the public as a matter of right for vehicular travel." Thus, a 
highway could include not only a "Roadway," but also separate bicycle lanes. 
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roadway, thus allowing bicycles to travel in their own lanes without any conflict with the 
vehicles using the roadway. 
Section 41-6-17(h) allows a city to regulate bicycle travel. Pursuant to this statute, a 
city clearly has the power to create and regulate separate bicycle lanes adjacent to the 
normal travel lanes on a city street. 
In adopting its bicycle lane ordinance, Salt Lake City created a carefully crafted plan 
for designated bicycle lanes to be provided adjacent to roadways traveled by cars. By 
Ordinance 12.52.140, the city expressly precluded automobiles from traveling in the bicycle 
lanes. Because cars are excluded from traveling in a bicycle lane, a bicycle lane cannot, by 
definition, be part of the "Roadway." 
Thus we see that the legislature has provided a scenario where cities are allowed to 
have a traffic scheme on their streets (highways) where they have both a "Roadway" open 
to all vehicles, and adjacent bicycle lanes where travel is strictly limited to bicycles. This 
eliminates the potential conflict between cars and bicycles which exists when a bicycle 
must travel on a "Roadway" shared with other vehicles. 
Notwithstanding the fact the term appears nowhere in the Traffic Control Act, 
respondents persuaded two of the Appellate Justices that State law prohibited "riding 
against the flow of traffic." However, that phrase is not contained in the State Statutes, and 
it mis-characterizes what occurred in this case. The remaining Justice dissented. If a panel 
of three learned judges cannot agree that there was an obvious conflict between the city 
6 
ordinance and State law, then it's a stretch to say there was such an obvious conflict that 
the ordinance is void ab initio because it is clearly in excess of the power to regulate 
bicycle travel granted by Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-17(h). 
In addition, a decision that the ordinance is void ab initio would seriously erode the 
confidence of the public in the plain language of the law. It would also foster anarchy by 
requiring lay people to construe the law at their peril, rather than leaving the job to the 
judiciary. 
As a general proposition, one has a due process right to rely upon the plain language 
of statutes and ordinances in determining one's behavior. If a city ordinance is in express 
conflict with a State law, a person might reasonably be expected to obtain legal advice on 
the subject matter before acting. The cases cited by Respondents relate to situations where 
there is an obvious conflict, and where due process and ex post facto considerations do not 
mandate a contrary conclusion. For example, the gambling situation creates an obvious 
conflict where a person could not argue that he should not have expected a State law 
prohibiting gambling might trump a county law that purports to allow gambling. 
In delegating power to the cities to regulate bicycle traffic, the legislature clearly had 
in mind that a city might create bicycle lanes which were not, by definition, part of a 
"Roadway" traveled by cars. This does not create a clear conflict with State statutes as 
argued by Respondents. Instead, it shows a well reasoned plan to keep bicycles off of the 
roadway, to avoid their coming in contact with cars traveling on the roadway. 
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Where the city expressly allows left-hand travel in designated bicycle lanes, and 
both city ordinances and the State Statute [§41-6-87(3)] mandate use of the bicycle lanes by 
bicyclists, it would be blatantly unfair to declare the ordinance void ab initio. Such a ruling 
would deprive Hansen of fair warning that his conduct, in obeying the Ordinance, might 
later be determined to have been prohibited. Such a result clearly would violate accepted 
principles of due process of law. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001); United States 
v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 (1997); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972); United 
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1953). 
Any conflict between the city bicycle ordinance and State law is not so obvious as to 
allow a layman to understand its existence. The Appellate Justices couldn't agree on this 
issue. How could a lay person be expected to make a correct determination of this issue at 
his peril. Therefore, Respondents' argument that due process wasn't violated because the 
ruling of the Court of Appeals was to be expected, is simply without merit. Id. 
The due process issues in this case arise from the justifiable reliance of Hansen on 
the language of the Ordinance. The Ordinance by its clear language allows him to travel in 
a left-hand bicycle lane. There is no conflict between State law and the Ordinance which is 
so clear as to allow Hansen to understand that he was in violation of any law when he 
followed the requirements of the Ordinance. Thus to find fault with his following the 
Ordinance would deny him Due Process of Law. Id. 
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POINT II 
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE RULING OF THE COURT OF 
APPEALS WOULD DENY PETITIONERS DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
The issue of whether the Salt Lake City Ordinance is valid is covered in Points I and 
III of this Reply Brief. This section deals with the claim of Respondents that retroactive 
application of the ruling of the Court of Appeals would not deny due process to Petitioners. 
The basis of Respondents' argument is that "[T]he court's conclusion that Utah law 
prohibits bicyclists from riding against the flow of traffic was not so unexpected or 
indefensible that it deprived Hansen of fair warning." Brief at 7. 
To the contrary. Utah statutory and common law existing on the date of Hansen's 
accident would lead him to believe his conduct, in conformity with the plain language of 
the ordinance, would not constitute a violation of State law. 
As set forth in Points I and III, travel in a bicycle lane is not, by definition, travel on 
a "Roadway." While state statutes require bicyclists to travel on the right side of a 
"Roadway," they say nothing about a bicycle traveling in a designated bicycle lane. 
On the date of the accident, no court had ever interpreted any State statute to 
preclude lefthand travel in a bicycle lane that excluded motor vehicle travel. 
The language of the state and local laws was also not so clear as to allow the Court 
of Appeals to agree on what was required by the language of the statutes and ordinances. If 
the Appellate Judges couldn't agree on the issue of whether or not there was a conflict 
9 
between the ordinance and the statutes, one certainly cannot say that the law on this issue 
was so clear that the ruling of the Court of Appeals was to be expected. 
It is an established principle of law that "no man shall be held criminally responsible 
for conduct he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." United States v. Lanier, 
supra. 
Respondents argue at length from the case of Rogers v. Tennessee, supra, to support 
their claim that retroactive application of the ruling of the Court of Appeals would not deny 
due process to Petitioners. However, their argument assumes that the city ordinance was 
void ab initio and that such a ruling would be obvious and expected. Such is simply not the 
case. 
The Rogers Court recognized the fact that some limitations on ex post facto judicial 
decision-making are inherent in the notion of due process of law. 532 U.S. at 456. In 
discussing the Court's prior ruling in Bouie v. City of Columbus, 387 U.S. 347 (1964), the 
Rogers Court held that retroactive application of the Court's construction of plain statutory 
language to include acts not set forth therein as criminal, violated due process principles. 
The Court said due process requires that a criminal statute must give fair warning of 
the conduct which is made criminal. The Court stated: 
Deprivation of the right to fair warning ... can result both from 
vague statutory language and from an unforeseeable and 
retroactive judicial expansion of statutory language that appears 
narrow and precise on its face ... 
10 
[I]f the construction is unexpected and indefensible by 
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the 
conduct in issue, the new construction must not be given 
retroactive effect. 532 U.S. at 457. 
The Court explained that the due process principles expressed in Bouie rest upon 
certain core principles of due process of law consisting of notice, foreseeability, and in 
particular, the right to fair warning as those concepts bear on the constitutionality of 
attaching criminal penalties to conduct that was previously innocent. 532 U.S. at 451. The 
Court expressly held: 
Due process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a 
criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior 
judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope. 532 
U.S. at 451. 
In this case, prior to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, no court had ever ruled that 
the mandates of Sections 41-6-53 or 41-6-87(1) whose language is limited to travel on a 
"Roadway," should be applied to travel in a bicycle lane adjacent to a roadway. The Court 
in Rogers said: 
Due process protects against judicial infringement of the right 
to fair warning that certain conduct will give rise to criminal 
penalties. 532 U.S. at 451. 
Any criminal conviction based upon an unforeseeable judicial construction of a 
statute violates due process of law. Id. See Rate v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972). 
The determination depends upon whether at the time of the conduct in question, the 
statute, standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear that the conduct was 
11 
criminal or prohibited. United States v. Lanier, supra at 267. As noted by the Court in 
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977): 
The notion that persons have a right to fair warning of that 
conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties - is 
fundamental to our concept of constitutional liberty. Id. at 191. 
See US. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1953). 
In the present case, Hansen was relying on the validity of an ordinance that allowed 
him to ride eastbound in a designated bicycle lane. Nowhere in any statute or judicial 
decision was there notice or warning that such conduct was either prohibited or criminal. 
Respondents seek to shift blame for the collision away from Eyre who was making a 
right turn while talking on her cell phone, and failed to yield to a bicycle rider in a 
designated bicycle lane. They argue Hansen should have foreseen that even though the 
ordinance specifically allowed his conduct, a State statute that deals with bicycle travel on a 
roadway would subsequently be construed to apply to travel in a bicycle lane that is by 
definition not part of the roadway, thereby retroactively removing the permission to ride in 
the left-hand bicycle lane which is expressly granted by the City Ordinance. 
This is the exact vice the United States Supreme Court has said violates due process. 
Such an interpretation is an expansive reading of language to cover a situation not evident 
from the statute's plain language, and which had not occurred previously by judicial 
interpretation. Due process requires fair notice to the actor of that conduct which is 
proscribed. Bouie v. City of Columbus, supra; Rogers v. Tennessee, supra; United States v. 
12 
Lanier, supra; Marks v. United States, supra; Rabe v. Washington, supra; United States v. 
Harriss, supra. 
Because Hansen acted in compliance with the plain language of Salt Lake City 
Ordinance 12.80.070 and had no fair notice that such conduct might violate a State statute, 
constitutional principles of due process of law absolutely preclude retroactive application of 
the Appellate Court's decision. 
POINT HI 
SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 12.80,070 IS A REASONABLE AND VALID 
EXERCISE OF THE POWER TO REGULATE BICYCLES. 
The Court of Appeals incorrectly determined there was a conflict between state law 
and Ordinance 12.80.070. 
In Point II of their brief, respondents argue that the Court of Appeals reasonably 
determined that State law prohibited Salt Lake City from adopting an ordinance that would 
allow bicycle riders to "ride against the flow of traffic." Brief at 23. 
Respondents argue that the decision of the Court of Appeals was correct because: 
1. A bicycle is a vehicle as defined under the Act. [U.C.A. § 41-6-1(39)]; and 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-1(39) specifies that a bicycle lane painted on the 
improved surface of the roadway in which Hansen was riding was part of the roadway for 
purposes of the Traffic Control Act. Brief at 23. (Quoting Hansen v. Eyre, 74 P.3d at 1182) 
The Court of Appeals erred in their reasoning by concluding that: 
13 
1. State law prohibits "riding against traffic," and 
2. Hansen was in fact "riding against traffic," and 
3. That the bicycle lane was a part of the roadway. 
As argued in Point I above, there is no language anywhere in the Traffic Control Act 
which uses the term "riding against the flow of traffic." The term "riding against the flow 
of traffic" is simply a label which Respondents have placed upon the conduct of Hansen to 
lend an emotional component to their arguments. 
As more fully set forth in Point I above, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that 
a bicycle lane is a part of a "roadway" has no support in the language of the Act. 
Section 41-6-1(39) clearly defines a roadway as that portion of a highway open to travel by 
all vehicles including bicycles. Since all vehicles cannot travel in a designated bicycle lane, 
simple logic, applied to the statutory definition of a roadway, leads to the inescapable 
conclusion that a bicycle lane is not part of the "roadway." 
The Traffic Control Act clearly defines the terms "highway" and "roadway." The 
act defines a highway as being the whole of the right-of-way. A highway may contain 
roadways, berms, a shoulder area and other areas which are not part of the defined 
roadway. Excluded from the definition of roadway are all areas of the highway which are 
not open to travel by all vehicles. While Section 41-6-1(39) expressly removes from the 
definition of a roadway, sidewalks, berms and shoulders, by implication any area of a 
14 
highway which is not open to travel by all vehicles would be excluded by definition from 
the roadway portion of the highway. This would include a designated bicycle lane. 
Although a bicycle lane is not specifically mentioned, the all inclusive definition of 
"highway" contemplates areas, such as a bicycle lane, that are not part of the roadway. The 
Act clearly contemplates the ability of a city to place a bicycle lane, which excludes travel 
by motor vehicles, next to a roadway, but within its right-of-way (highway). Thus a 
highway could properly contain not only a "roadway" where all vehicles can travel, but also 
a bicycle lane where only bicycles can travel. 
The Appellate Court apparently concluded that because § 41-6-1(39) speaks only 
about excluding berms, shoulders and sidewalks on a highway from the "Roadway" 
definition, then the legislature intended to include bicycle lanes as a part of the roadway. 
Such reasoning requires an enormous leap of faith as nothing in the language leads to such 
a conclusion. Such a conclusion is simply illogical. It makes more sense to conclude that a 
bicycle lane is not part of a roadway, because other vehicles cannot travel in a bicycle lane, 
than to include it in a definition that allows travel by all vehicles. 
In addition, the Appellate Court also ignored the fact that the bicycle lane is 
separated from the roadway travel lanes and set off by a solid white line, the type of 
marking routinely used to delineate the edge of a roadway. A bicycle lane could also 
arguably be considered part of the shoulder, which is specifically excluded from the 
definition of a roadway by § 41-6-1(39). 
15 
By creating separate bicycle lanes adjacent to the vehicle travel lanes on city streets, 
the City clearly intended to create travel lanes for bicycles which would allow a place to 
ride where there was no conflict with motor vehicles. 
Section 41-6-87(1) clearly contemplates that when there are no bicycle lanes, a 
bicycle must share the roadway with other vehicular traffic. In these situations, a bicycle 
must, with certain exceptions set forth therein, stay to the right. 
But as pointed out by Justice Jackson in his dissent, Section 41-6-87(3), which 
requires a bicycle to use a bicycle lane when one is available, is superfluous and makes no 
sense if a separately created bicycle lane where other vehicular travel is prohibited, is in 
fact part of a roadway which by definition is open to use by all vehicles. This sub-section 
makes sense only in the context of a bicycle lane which is not a part of the roadway. 
A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the general intent and purpose of an 
act, taken as a whole, be interpreted in harmony to manifest its objectives. Miller v. 
Weaver, 66 P.3d 592 (Utah 2003). Where the state has delegated to the city power to 
regulate bicycle traffic, both the State statute and the city ordinance should be construed in 
pari materia and harmonized if possible. Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 
(1985). 
When we consider the fact that the city created separate bicycle lanes with the intent 
they not be considered a part of the roadway, then the mandates of State law can be 
harmonized with the bicycle ordinance without violence to either. The bicycle lanes are set 
16 
apart from the roadway by solid white lines and other vehicles are prohibited from traveling 
therein. The bicycle riders have their own exclusive area of travel where there is no conflict 
with the motorized vehicles traveling on the adjacent roadway. Other vehicles are 
precluded from traveling in the bicycle lanes. Such a plan makes complete sense and is 
clearly contemplated in the grant to the cities of the power to regulate bicycle travel within 
the city. 
The bicycle lanes are placed adjacent to the roadway, but are not part of the 
roadway. They are a part of the shoulder and clearly marked as such under provisions of the 
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. They are to be separated from the roadway 
by a solid white line. The city separates a bicycle lane from a roadway by prohibiting other 
vehicles from traveling in the bicycle lane. 
Thus the city has by specific design separated bicycle lanes from its roadways. By 
definition, the State statutes which require right-hand travel of bicycles traveling on a 
roadway do not apply to travel in the separate bicycle lanes. This traffic regulatory scheme 
in turn validates the meaning of Section 41-6-87(3) which requires that a bicyclist forego 
travel upon a roadway, where he would compete with other vehicle traffic, and instead use 
a separately defined bicycle lane when one is provided. 
Thus by simply applying the plain wording of the definitions set forth in Section 41-
6-1 and the requirements of all three subsections of Section 41-6-87, we see that a bicycle 
lane is not a part of a roadway; that bicycles must use a bicycle lane when one is provided; 
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and that rules applicable to bicycles traveling on "roadways" do not apply to travel within a 
separately designated bicycle lane. Thus there is no conflict between State statutes and the 
city ordinance regulating bicycle traffic. 
Point IV 
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER CONDUCT WHICH COMPLIES WITH THE 
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF AN EXISTING ORDINANCE IS NEGLIGENT IS 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
This is a negligence case involving a collision between the Hansen bicycle and a 
truck driven by Amanda Eyre. Respondents claim Hansen acted negligently in riding in the 
left-hand bicycle lane, even though such conduct is expressly allowed under Ordinance 
12.80.070. 
The Summary Judgment Motion filed by Petitioners simply asked the trial court to 
validate Hansen's belief that he wasn't negligent for riding m a left-hand bicycle lane, as 
allowed by ordinance. This appeal came about because the trial court ruled that State law 
prohibited use of the left-hand bicycle lane, and the jury would need to be instructed that 
Hansen had no legal right to act in conformance with the express language of the 
Ordinance. 
Respondents argue Hansen had no right to rely on the Ordinance. Petitioners claim 
that due process considerations forbid use of a post-collision ruling on the validity of the 
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city ordinance as a basis for determining whether or not Hansen's conduct on February 17, 
2000 violated State law and was, therefore, negligent. 
Since Utah law allows a jury to find a person negligent for violating a law intended 
to promote safety, the determination of whether the mere act of complying with the Salt 
Lake City Ordinance is a violation of law is crucial to the negligence issues in this case. 
This issue is before this Court because the trial court in its ruling, which serves as 
the basis for this appeal, said the jury is to be instructed that Hansen had no legal right to 
ride in the left-hand bicycle lane. 
However, even if the issue were not before the Court, because it wasn't expressly 
delineated in the Petition for Certiorari, it is an issue the Court should decide because it will 
come up at the trial after remand. A decision on the issue at this time will avoid the 
necessity of another appeal on the issue. Issues not specifically raised may be considered 
for the purpose of avoiding an additional appeal after remand. Robinson v. All Star 
Delivejy, Inc., 992 P.2d 969 (Utah 1999). 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The definitive issue in the trial upon remand will be whether or not Tyler Hansen's 
riding in the left-hand bicycle lane was, of itself, a violation of law and therefore prima 
facie negligent. The issue of whether Hansen had a legal right, protected by due process, to 
rely on the plain language of Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070 controls the issue of 
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whether he violated any state law by riding in the left-hand bicycle lane. Whether he 
violated State law controls the issue of whether riding in the left-hand bicycle lane was 
negligence. 
As set forth herein and in Respondents' opening Brief, the Salt Lake City Ordinance 
was properly adopted by Salt Lake City pursuant to authority granted to the city by the 
legislature. Even were this Court to find that Salt Lake City exceeded its authority in 
creating bicycle lanes adjacent to the traveled portion of city streets, a retroactive 
application of any ruling holding that the city ordinance conflicted with state law would not 
be allowable because it would deny Hansen due process of law. Because the ruling of the 
Majority Opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming the ruling of the trial court purported to 
do so, it effectively denied Petitioners' due process of law. 
For the reasons set forth in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Briefs filed herein, 
Petitioners respectfully request that this Court issue a ruling that Salt Lake City Ordinance 
12.80.070 is valid and that Hansen had the right, on the date of the collision between the 
Eyre vehicle and the Hansen bicycle, to legally ride his bicycle in the left-hand bicycle lane 
pursuant to the express language of Ordinance 12.80.070. 
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of May, 2004. 
Mel. S. Martin, P.C. 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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V 
ADDENDUM 
22 
TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-53 
ARTICLE 7 
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO DRIVING 
ON RIGHT SIDE OF HIGHWAY, 
OVERTAKING, PASSING AND 
OTHER RULES OF 
THE ROAD 
41-6-53. Duty to operate vehicle on right side of roadway 
— Exceptions. 
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be operated upon the 
right half of the roadway, except: 
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction under the rules governing that movement; 
(b) when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the 
center of the roadway, but the operator shall yield the right-of-way to all 
vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portions 
of the highway within a distance constituting an immediate hazard; 
(c) on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the 
applicable rules; or 
(d) on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic. 
(2) On all roadways a vehicle proceeding at less than the normal speed of 
traffic under the existing conditions shall be operated in the right-hand lane 
then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or 
edge of the roadway, except when overtaking and passing another vehicle 
proceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a left turn at an 
intersection or into a private road or driveway. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 43; C. 1943, 
57-7-120; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 14; 1987, ch. 138, § 52. 
ANALYSIS 
Backing. 
Bicycle and truck. 
Effect of passing from right to center. 
"Half of the roadway" construed. 
Instructions. 
Negligence. 
Presumptions. 
Question for jury. 
Violation as evidence of negligence. 
Cited. 
Backing. 
Statutes requiring that vehicles keep to right 
have no applicability to backing. Naisbitt v. 
Eggett, 5 Utah 2d 5, 295 R2d 832 (1956). 
Bicycle and truck. 
The driver of a truck who was on right side of 
street and was not on, near to, or approaching a 
crossing where both vehicles and pedestrians 
might pass either or both ways had the right to 
relax his vigilance and was not required to do 
more than to maintain such lookout as would 
prevent his colliding or coming in contact with 
anyone on his side of street. Richards v. Palace 
Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 186 P. 439 (1919). 
Effect of passing from right to center. 
While in case a street or highway is not used 
by others one may drive on any part thereof, 
yet, when a motorist or bicyclist passes from 
right to left of the center of the street, he loses 
some of his rights, and he may not be heard to 
complain of the conduct of those who are on the 
proper side of street to the same extent as 
though he also were on the proper side. 
Richards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 
186 P. 439 (1919). 
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries 
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SALT LAKE CITY CODE 
12.52.140 Bicycle Lanes-Right Of Way And Vehicle Restrictions: 
1. No motor vehicle shall at any time be driven within or through, or parked or stopped 
within a marked bicycle lane, except to briefly cross such lane to turn into an intersection, 
street, alley, driveway or other parking area. Any vehicle so turning must yield the right of 
way to all bicycles within the lane that are close enough to constitute an immediate 
hazard. No motor vehicle may use a bicycle lane as a turning lane. On all roads with no 
bicycle lane, operators of bicycles have the same rights, duties and responsibilities as 
operators of motor vehicles. (Prior code Title 46, Art. 15 § 246(a)) 
